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Deterring and Dissuading Nuclear Terrorism
Abstract
While nuclear deterrence theory may be well-suited to dealing with nuclear-armed states,
its suitability for deterring nuclear terrorism has frequently been questioned since 9/11.
While terrorist organizations do not necessarily act uniformly or according to the same
underlying beliefs, many of the most aggressive organizations are motivated by an ideology
that embraces martyrdom and an apocalyptic vision.1 This ideology may be based on
religion or a desire to overthrow a government. Consequently, terrorists motivated by
ideology who intend to use a stolen or improvised nuclear device against the United States
or its interests may not care about the resulting military repercussions following a nuclear
attack. In such a scenario, some strategists think a terrorist organization's leadership may
prove "undeterrable" by traditional military means. Nevertheless, deterrence is still a
critical element in U.S. national strategy to prevent a nuclear attack. Furthermore,
deterrence combined with dissuasion works to reduce the likelihood of nuclear terrorism
being used against the United States, while also mitigating the consequences should such
an act actually occur.
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Abstract
While nuclear deterrence theory may be well-suited to dealing with
nuclear-armed states, its suitability for deterring nuclear terrorism has
frequently been questioned since 9/11. While terrorist organizations do
not necessarily act uniformly or according to the same underlying beliefs,
many of the most aggressive organizations are motivated by an ideology
that embraces martyrdom and an apocalyptic vision.1 This ideology may
be based on religion or a desire to overthrow a government. Consequently, terrorists motivated by ideology who intend to use a stolen or
improvised nuclear device against the United States or its interests may
not care about the resulting military repercussions following a nuclear
attack. In such a scenario, some strategists think a terrorist organization's
leadership may prove "undeterrable" by traditional military means. Nevertheless, deterrence is still a critical element in U.S. national strategy to
prevent a nuclear attack. Furthermore, deterrence combined with dissuasion works to reduce the likelihood of nuclear terrorism being used
against the United States, while also mitigating the consequences should
such an act actually occur.

Introduction
Now that a decade has passed since the 9/11 attacks, it is worth contemplating the ever-growing possibility that terrorists, rather than a sovereign state, could trigger the first modern-day detonation of a nuclear
weapon. For well over a decade, al-Qaida and similar violent extremist
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organizations have communicated their interest in using nuclear weapons
against the United States or its allies. Even though this potential threat
does not come from a nuclear-armed state, the risk of a future nuclear
attack is real and menacing. Despite this fact, the means of deterring
nuclear-armed terrorists and the role of the U.S. nuclear arsenal are
largely misunderstood.2
Many strategists and policymakers continue to spend significant time and
energy thinking about the possible actions of terrorists, including those
who may become nuclear-armed. This is understandable considering
there is enough weapons-usable nuclear material worldwide for an estimated 120,000 nuclear weapons, and much of this material remains
unprotected.3 Consistent with the view of many analysts, the 2010 U.S.
National Security Strategy states:
"[T]here is no greater threat to the American people than weapons of mass destruction, particularly the danger posed by the pursuit of nuclear weapons by violent extremists and their
proliferation to additional states."4
Al-Qaida and similar extremist organizations are considered the groups
most likely to want nuclear weapons.5 The Strategy goes on to note that
securing vulnerable nuclear material is paramount because, according to
current assessments, terrorists are determined to buy, build, or steal a
nuclear weapon.6 To address this threat, the United States is leading an
effort to secure all vulnerable or loose nuclear material by the end of
2013.7 Moreover, the international community has acknowledged the
threat of nuclear terrorism. In April 2010, over 45 countries participated
in the Nuclear Security Summit in Washington, D.C. in order to arrive at a
common understanding about the threat of nuclear terrorism. A second
summit will be held in the Republic of Korea in 2012.
Terrorists do not necessarily share the same goals or need the same capabilities as states. In many cases, a terrorist organization may consider a
low-yield detonation a success for its intended purpose. According to estimates, a ten-kiloton nuclear detonation in an urban environment could
kill tens of thousands of people and level buildings within half a mile,
while structures between a half-mile and a mile away would experience
significant destruction.8 In general, a violent extremist organization may
become nuclear-armed in primarily two ways. First, it may buy or steal a
nuclear weapon that has fallen out of state control. Second, it may build
an improvised nuclear device using widely distributed designs, after having acquired the necessary nuclear material to do so.9 As has been said,
nuclear material may be bought, stolen, or acquired in some other way.
16
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With Pakistani nuclear scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan having transferred
nuclear technology to Iran, North Korea, and Libya, some terrorist organizations may be able to more easily acquire the technology and material
to fabricate an improvised nuclear device.10 Acquiring nuclear material,
however, is not the final step in an act of nuclear terrorism. A potential
attacker must still have the expertise to assemble the nuclear device,
transport and store it, get the weapon to its intended target, and achieve a
nuclear detonation.

Deterrence Theory
In a frequently cited definition, deterrence is "persuading a potential
enemy that it is in his own interest to avoid certain courses of action."11
The underlying tenet of nuclear deterrence theory, a subset of general
deterrence, is that the credible and potentially overwhelming force of
using nuclear weapons against any would-be adversary is sufficient to
deter most potential aggressors from employing nuclear weapons. More
importantly, it has been noted, "Given that deterrence can only work,
when it does, in the minds of enemy leaders, it is their worldview, not
ours, that must determine whether or not deterrence succeeds."12 Therefore, to deter a potential adversary, we must deter its leadership.
At the heart of the nuclear deterrence concept lies a paradox. If nuclear
weapons are used, deterrence has failed, and yet establishing a credible
deterrence capability requires planning for its intended use. For the
United States, it is only by maintaining an effective and credible nuclear
strike capability and planning for its use against an adversary that deterrence is possible. Thus, some of the most destructive weapons of war—
nuclear weapons—can, in fact, be used to promote peace and stability.
According to the "2010 U.S. Nuclear Posture Review Report," the primary
role of the U.S. nuclear arsenal is to deter a nuclear attack on the United
States, as well as on allies and partners.13 It is therefore U.S. policy that as
long as nuclear weapons exist, the United States will sustain a safe,
secure, and effective nuclear arsenal, both to deter potential adversaries
and to assure U.S. allies and other security partners they can count on
America's security commitments.14 Although the current U.S. administration wishes to reduce the country's nuclear arsenal, it is trying to do so
without affecting the reliability and effectiveness of its nuclear weapons,
including their deterrent effect.15 Thus, nuclear weapons are still thought
to play a fundamental role in deterring potential adversaries, especially
those who are nuclear-armed.

17
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But, alas, deterrence is at times limited. For example, when "the challenger is not dispassionate, well-informed, or reasonable, as frequently
has been the case in historical experience, deterrence cannot be assumed
to function predictably."16 The theory of stable deterrence, used for
decades during the Cold War, represents "an attempt at a Jominian solution to a problem that was essentially Clausewitzian in nature."17 So while
stable deterrence theory may be based on elaborate calculations meant to
"ensure" that deterrence is achieved through the deployment, threat, or
use of nuclear weapons, these sophisticated calculations and strategic
analyses are at odds with the fact that most conflicts and crises are determined by the "attitudes, expectations, perceptions, and behavior of antagonists."18 Additionally, when attempting to employ a deterrence strategy,
the adversary's assessment of costs, benefits, and probabilities may often
be misunderstood.19
The question is: "Can terrorists be deterred?" The Bush administration's
National Security Strategy addressed this question by noting:
"Traditional concepts of deterrence will not work against a terrorist enemy whose avowed tactics are wanton destruction and the
targeting of innocents; whose so called soldiers seek martyrdom
in death and whose most potent protection is statelessness."20
Some critics of deterrence have argued that terrorists motivated by ideology and intending to use a stolen or improvised nuclear device against the
United States may not care about the military repercussions; therefore, a
terrorist organization's leadership may prove undeterrable by military
means.
In contrast to this view, others have observed that the proposition that
terrorist organizations and their leadership represent undeterrable foes
seems at best a half-truth.21 At times, and under the right conditions, the
credible threat of overwhelming force may dissuade terrorist leadership
from pursuing direct confrontation or initiating an attack.

Law of Armed Conflict
Classical deterrence theory works only if there is a credible threat of
retaliatory force. What is considered a credible use of force within the U.S.
defense community is typically governed by the Law of Armed Conflict.
While not directive or preventive of any future action, the ideas and
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principles within the Law of Armed Conflict are relevant when
considering a response to terrorism, including to the actions of nucleararmed terrorists.
The Law of Armed Conflict has been defined as the part of international
law that regulates the conduct of armed hostilities.22 It is based on two
main sources: customary international law arising out of hostilities and
binding on all states; and international treaty law arising from international treaties, which binds only those states that ratified a particular
treaty. The purpose of the Law of Armed Conflict is to reduce the damage
and casualties of any conflict; protect combatants and noncombatants
from unnecessary suffering; safeguard the fundamental rights of combatants and noncombatants; and make it easier to restore peace after the
conflict's conclusion.
Of the principles contained in the Law, two are most germane to potential
military actions following an act of nuclear terrorism. These are the principles of military necessity and lawful targeting. The first, military necessity, calls for using only that degree and kind of force required for the
partial or complete submission of the enemy, while considering the minimum expenditure of time, life, and physical resources.23 This principle is
designed to limit the application of force to that required for carrying out
lawful military purposes. Although the principle of military necessity recognizes that some collateral damage and incidental injury to civilians may
occur when a legitimate military target is attacked, this does not excuse
the destruction of lives and property disproportionate to the military
advantage to be gained.24
The second principle, lawful targeting, is based on three assumptions.25
First, a belligerent's right to injure the enemy is not unlimited. Second,
launching attacks against civilian populations is prohibited. Third, combatants must be distinguished from noncombatants in order to spare noncombatants injury as much as possible. Consequently, under lawful
targeting all "reasonable precautions" must be taken to ensure that only
military objectives are targeted in order to avoid, as much as possible,
damage to civilian objects (collateral damage) and death and injury to
civilians (incidental injury).26
Key to applying the principle of lawful targeting is distinguishing between
military objectives and civilian objects. Civilian objects include places of
worship, schools, hospitals, and dwellings, but these can lose their
protected status if they are used to support military action. While an
attacker should not intentionally assault civilians or employ methods or
means that would cause excessive collateral civilian casualties, a defender
19

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2012

Journal of Strategic Security, Vol. 5, No. 1

Journal of Strategic Security

is obligated to separate civilians and civilian objects from legitimate
military targets. Failure to separate them may lead to a loss of their
protected status.

Discussion
The application of the principle of military necessity to any potential U.S.
military response following an act of nuclear terrorism means that any
military response, including nuclear, should not exceed the kind or degree
of force needed to accomplish the military objective. Therefore, if a lowyield nuclear weapon is detonated within the United States, the most
appropriate U.S. response to accomplish the military objective might be
to employ a similar low-yield nuclear weapon. If, for whatever reason, a
commensurate low-yield nuclear weapon was not readily available,
national leadership likely would need to weigh other options for achieving
the military objective, such as whether to employ a higher-yield nuclear
weapon or conventional weapons with a similar kiloton destructive effect.
A higher-yield nuclear response, however, could exceed the degree of
force needed to accomplish the military objective and, therefore, be in
violation of the Law of Armed Conflict. On the other hand, responding
conventionally to a nuclear attack likely would limit future deterrence
efforts.
In applying the principle of lawful targeting, the selected target for any
nuclear response should be a military objective, in order to minimize collateral damage and incidental injury as much as possible. It is worth noting that in the latest Nuclear Posture Review statement, the United States
renews its commitment
"to hold fully accountable any state, terrorist group, or other nonstate actor that supports or enables terrorist efforts to obtain or
use weapons of mass destruction, whether by facilitating, financing, or providing expertise or safe haven for such efforts."27
This statement threatens retaliatory force against either state or non-state
actors. As others have noted, however, picking an actual target for a military response following an act of nuclear terrorism could prove problematic, since non-state-sponsored terrorists may not have clear geographic
boundaries, making it difficult to avoid death and injury to civilians. This
exact problem is why many strategists and policymakers have long argued
that deterrence is ineffective against terrorist leadership, since a credible
U.S. response following an act of nuclear terrorism may not be viable.
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Counterarguments
There are several possible counterarguments to the contention that deterrence is ineffective against terrorist leadership. Some might argue that the
United States would not be bound by the Law of Armed Conflict following
an act of nuclear terrorism because terrorists are unlawful combatants
who do not, as a matter of course, follow its provisions. After all, unlawful
combatants are by definition individuals who directly participate in hostilities without being authorized by a governmental authority, and nonstate-sponsored terrorists fall in this category. Nevertheless, any U.S.
response to an attack by nuclear-armed terrorists—that is, by unlawful
combatants—should follow the Law of Armed Conflict's tenets. Indeed,
the Law addresses terrorist actions by noting that unlawful combatants
who engage in hostilities are in violation of the Law of Armed Conflict and
in doing so become lawful targets. Consequently, they may be killed or
wounded and, if captured, may be tried as war criminals for their actions.
Some critics might also argue that since nuclear terrorism is a form of
asymmetric warfare, the United States must adapt any potential response
by holding at risk those objects the terrorists value most. In the case of
religious extremists, potential targets could include places holding special
religious or cultural significance. Therefore, the argument goes, if nonstate-sponsored ideological extremists attack the U.S. homeland with an
improvised nuclear device, the United States should attack places of religious and cultural significance, including those within metropolitan centers. A credible threat of such a U.S. response against religious and
cultural centers would therefore deter ideological extremists. Holding at
risk a potential adversary's religious and cultural centers, however, goes
against the principle of lawful targeting, since the response may not discriminate between military objectives and civilian objects, because the
targeted places of worship and religious centers would be considered
civilian objects under most circumstances. Even when considering the
legitimate use of reprisals in response to enemy actions that are noncompliant with the Law of Armed Conflict, an act of reprisal still cannot deliberately target religious or cultural property.28 If these objects are used for
military purposes, however, they lose their immunity. Additionally, if
these protected objects are located near lawful military objectives, which
the Law of Armed Conflict prohibits, they may suffer collateral damage
when the nearby military objectives are lawfully engaged.
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A Holistic Strategy of Prevention
The goal of a strategy seeking to prevent an act of nuclear terrorism is to
cause a terrorist organization's leaders to determine that such an act will
fail in achieving their desired objectives and, therefore, decide not to pursue the nuclear attack. While the credible threat of a military response is
necessary for effective deterrence, any means available to support this
goal of prevention is a viable component of a suitable strategy. Other suitable means could include nonmilitary activities if they support discouraging a potential adversary from pursuing an act of nuclear terrorism. Thus,
an overall strategy of prevention should use both military and nonmilitary
approaches that include integrated and layered activities. Such a strategy
represents a more holistic approach to dealing with the threat of nuclear
terrorism. The military and nonmilitary activities supporting the goal of
prevention can be categorized as "deterrence" and "dissuasion."

Deterrence
The first step in establishing the most effective U.S. prevention strategy
possible is "relearning" that deterrence remains a viable concept, even
when attempting to address the threat of nuclear terrorism. Many terrorist organizations, including al-Qaida, function strategically and rationally.29 Consequently, deterrence is still viable. There is nothing within
the Law of Armed Conflict that explicitly prohibits a U.S. nuclear response
to an act of nuclear terrorism, even one that is non-state-sponsored. As
long as the principles of military necessity and lawful targeting are duly
considered, a nuclear response would still be a viable option. For example, such an option would exist if, following a low-yield nuclear detonation by terrorists within the U.S. homeland, a suitable military objective
can be targeted using a U.S. nuclear response of degree and kind needed
to achieve the military objective. This is not to say significant diplomatic
efforts will not be needed before any U.S. nuclear response, especially
since the military objective to be targeted will be located within the boarders of a sovereign state. In the end, the highest levels of national leadership, including the president, would have to approve any nuclear
response. Also worth noting is that a possible U.S. nonnuclear response to
nuclear terrorism can also have a deterrent effect. By conducting persistent and aggressive counterterrorism operations to seek out the most militant terrorist organizations, the United States can increase a potential
adversary's perception that there would be a credible threat of force following any attack against the United States. If al-Qaida's leadership
believed that following an act of nuclear terrorism the United States
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would systematically seek them out and, through nuclear or conventional
means, threaten their survival, they might be deterred from employing a
nuclear weapon or an improvised nuclear device.
In the case of state-sponsored nuclear terrorism, the knowledge that the
United States has the option to respond in kind to a nuclear attack can
increase the likelihood of deterring states that knowingly provide a terrorist organization with, or the opportunity to acquire, a nuclear weapon or
nuclear material for an improvised nuclear device. Therefore, in the effort
to "hold fully accountable" any state that enables terrorists to obtain, or
that facilitates the use of, nuclear weapons against the United States or its
interests, the U.S. response against the complicit state may include a
nuclear option. While the problems inherent in selecting a suitable military objective associated with an act of non-state-sponsored terrorism
have been noted, these problems are mitigated in a scenario involving a
supporting or facilitating state, because there are clear geographic boundaries, and reasonable precautions may be taken to help ensure that collateral damage and incidental injury are avoided as much as possible.

Dissuasion
The other piece of the strategy puzzle, dissuasion, aims to use a targeted
strategy and policy to cause countries or potential adversaries from initiating military action.30 To be effective, dissuasion activities must occur
before a threat manifests itself. "Shaping activities," typically nonmilitary
in scope and conducted during peacetime, are included in activities meant
to dissuade potential adversaries.31 In the context used within the U.S.
military services, dissuasion works outside the potential threat of military
action.32 Dissuasion of current or potential nuclear-armed adversaries
therefore seeks to convey the futility of using or proliferating nuclear
weapons or nuclear material.33 It does so with the intent of causing a
potential adversary to forgo a path leading to military confrontation.
Some think that those dissuaded from competing with the United States
should not need to be deterred.34 With respect to dissuading a terrorist
organization from acquiring nuclear weapons, such an approach should
focus on four aspects: interdiction, consequence management, nuclear
forensics, and monetary interception.
Interdiction efforts meant to counter the proliferation of nuclear weapons
or nuclear material can succeed in thwarting a potential attacker. A significant capability in intelligence collection, detection, and identification can
help discriminate a potential threat from nonthreatening materials coming through ports or across boarders. Surveillance supporting nuclear
interdiction efforts can focus on known transit and smuggling routes,
23
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monitor choke points of commercial trade, and utilize standoff nuclear
detection technology. All of these interdiction activities are meant to
impede the proliferation of nuclear weapons or nuclear material, as well
as slow and make more costly access to sensitive technologies, material,
and expertise.
Preparations in consequence-management efforts, such as those dealing
with emergency medical response, humanitarian assistance, and disaster
relief operations following an act of nuclear terrorism, could make a
valuable difference in the level of societal destruction and personnel
casualties. These preparations seek to mitigate the consequences of an act
of nuclear terrorism. In cases where it is questionable whether a nucleararmed terrorist group can be deterred, past analyses suggest that a
relatively austere emergency medical response, humanitarian assistance,
and disaster relief measures can provide the highest initial return on the
dollar for protection across a broad spectrum of plausible nuclear threats.
Some have estimated that it may be possible to turn the death rate from
ninety percent to twenty or thirty percent simply by being well-prepared
in advance for a potential nuclear event.35 To minimize the impact of a
nuclear terrorist attack, the U.S. National Response Framework and other
documents outline interagency roles and responsibilities to guide
consequence-management activities. Post-detonation consequencemanagement activities, which would be conducted concurrently with any
civil-military humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations,
include securing the incident site, assessing the radioactivity at the site,
enhancing first responder capabilities, providing radiological medical
triage capabilities, and increasing population resilience and recovery
capabilities.36
Developing a responsive nuclear forensics capability is the third aspect of
dissuading nuclear terrorism. Nuclear forensics is the science of determining the source and pathway of a nuclear weapon or nuclear material
after it is interdicted or detonated. Following a nuclear or radiological
attack, post-detonation nuclear forensics activities likely will be under
pressure and time constraints to perform quickly. The Nuclear Forensics
and Attribution Act seeks to strengthen U.S. Department of Homeland
Security efforts to develop nuclear forensics capabilities that would help
attribute the source of nuclear material.37 A robust and well-known capability to identify the source of nuclear or radiological material intended
for, or used in, an act of terrorism could, it is thought, dissuade prospective proliferators or those supporting nuclear terrorism.38 Furthermore,
the threat of effective attribution following the science of nuclear foren-
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sics could lead to improved security at other countries' nuclear material
storage facilities, thereby preventing the unwitting transfer of nuclear or
radiological materials.
The last aspect of dissuading nuclear terrorism involves aggressive efforts
to intercept and minimize funding sources used by militant extremist
groups. Funding is critical to sustaining the activities of most terrorist
organizations. In the past, such funding has come through charities,
illegal activities, and front companies. Persistent multinational fiscalinterdiction efforts could significantly reduce the funding available to
support any potential nuclear terrorism activities. These monetary
interception efforts could include targeting transactions supporting
terrorist organizations, whether conducted by states, nongovernmental
organizations, or private entities. Economic efforts to thwart nuclear
proliferation might focus on the potential suppliers of nuclear or
radiological material.39 A sustained effort to eliminate or minimize
funding sources used by terrorist organizations could help curtail future
recruits for the organization's cause. This in turn might lead to a sense of
futility within the organization. Combined monetary efforts such as this
could dissuade a terrorist organization's leaders from pursuing a path of
direct confrontation through nuclear terrorism.

Conclusion
In today's security environment, the threat of nuclear terrorism remains a
persistent concern. While some strategists and policymakers have opined
that nuclear-armed terrorists are undeterrable and deterrence is ineffectual against non-state actors, the demise of deterrence's role in U.S. strategy has been overstated. Because the leaders of most terrorist
organizations, including al-Qaida, are rational and function strategically,
they can, in fact, be deterred to some degree. Moreover, when dissuasion
works with deterrence as part of a broader strategy of prevention, the
United States is better able to employ a holistic approach that seeks to
cause a violent extremist organization's leaders to decide for themselves
not to pursue an act of nuclear terrorism.
To be capable of deterring a range of potential threats, the United States
must maintain an effective and tested nuclear arsenal, which frequently
will require modernization. Furthermore, the country must have a suitable range of nuclear weapons that can deliver minor to severe military
damage, depending on the scenario. Considering the Law of Armed Conflict's implications, the U.S. nuclear arsenal should include low-yield
weapons in order to give the president the best range of response options
25
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to an act of nuclear terrorism. If tactical, low-yield nuclear weapons are
not maintained in the arsenal, it will be harder to convey to a would-be
aggressor that the United States has a credible nuclear response to an act
of nuclear terrorism using a low-yield weapon or improvised nuclear
device. While the present U.S. administration advocates retaining and
modernizing some of the lowest-yield nuclear weapons, implementing the
plan remains uncertain because of continuing budgetary pressures.
History suggests that deterrence will at times fail due to miscalculation,
uncertainty, or chance. This may also be the case for deterrence of
nuclear-armed terrorists. If deterrence fails and an attack occurs, having
aggressive programs in place to manage the consequences of a nuclear
detonation could reduce or limit the damage. A side benefit of a strategy
incorporating nuclear deterrence and dissuasion against nuclear terrorism is that potential nuclear-armed adversaries may be deterred or dissuaded because they know the United States can offer a decisive military
response, while managing the consequences of a nuclear attack and investigating and determining the attack's source if not immediately known.
A strategy incorporating both deterrence and dissuasion can make great
strides in preventing an act of nuclear terrorism, but only if national leaders make it a top priority. Many Americans regret that more was not done
to improve counterterrorism capabilities and strategies before the 9/11
attacks, especially since many of the needed improvements seemed obvious afterwards. Similarly, the United States needs a sound and comprehensive strategy to deter and dissuade nuclear terrorism. To wait until
after such an attack would be unforgivable.
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